Reflections on cognitive interdependencies in policy making

the value of framing concepts

2008-08-24T22:57:00.005+02:00

Framing concepts are definitely very helpful for analysing - or in a first step heuristically describing - policy making processes in complex environments like the European Union.

Two important reasons stand out in this regard: Firstly the very limited amount of actual knowledge about the a given policy that exists among the relevant actors; and secondly the fact that policy processes and - even more so - policy documents are highly abstract in nature, which makes it very difficult to conceive many actors that have direct experience or schemata that could function as an a priori context for a policy message.

Thus, if almost nobody knows what exactly a policy tries to accomplish, and even fewer people have a preconceived idea how to judged such a policy, a policy frame (which defines the problem, identifies the cause, provides a value judgement and proposes a remedy to address the problem) becomes the most important cognitive basis for the policy making process. Applied to a concrete case, an interesting question is exactly how few people can be expected to know what a policy is about and why it is necessary.

time is running

2008-08-24T18:39:00.001+02:00

It has again been many months since the last post here, and despite the fact that theory-building has to some extend been pushed onto to the backseat (at least in any direct, concretely manifested manner) due to more pragmatic, in-the-field research activities, a number of issues have emerged that will be reported here.

To start: It has become very clear that the moving-target quality of policy-making warrants specific attention. While any policy document has a prescriptive quality to it, ie. is meant to trigger certain developments or at least reactions, some documents seem to be little more than defensive instruments developed to essentially accomplish two things:

1. Fulfill a political promise that a certain measure would be taken by a specified time in regard to constructed problem or need

2. To provide a document that, while being broadly acceptable to the stakeholders involved in the issue, summarizes the questions at stake hinting in a certain direction without actually answering them.

Thus, such a document is meant to functionally clarifying a political issues in order to keep the drafting entity in business of coming up with follow-up documents and reports, thereby proving involvement and responsibility taken seriously (and hence proving its own relevance)

ETI - still alive

2008-02-19T22:40:00.001+01:00

The ETI is still ravelling along. Proof of its existance are the contributions to a recently finished public consultation on a proposal for code of conduct for interest represenatives. To be found here:

European Commission - Consultation on a Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives - Contributions

quoted on euractiv.com

2007-08-25T01:22:00.001+02:00

The RCIPM blog has been mentioned (or listed - to be honest :-) on a EurActiv.com article about "Blogs: Filling the EU's 'communication gap'?".

ETI update

2007-07-16T23:32:00.000+02:00

I just attended a talk with a Cabinet Member of Commissioner Kallas who informed an interested audience about the ETI. As news, it was understood that the COM currently negotiates with the EP to broaden the scope of the register to cover lobbyists working with both EU institutions.

Interestingly, he summed the initiative up by stressing that it addresses transparency in three regards: (1) in terms of the identity of interest representatives; (2) as means to ensure balanced access to policy makers (or rather as defensive mechanism, so that the COM can proof it is not biased in its choices of conversation partners); (3) as a precaution to prevent “Abramoff” to happen in the EU.

According to his explanations, the ETI is also meant fight “deceptive” lobbying i.e. via front groups. Those front groups were also cited to support the argument that financial disclosure is necessary in the proposed lobby register. Another argument used was that companies might use funds to lobby against regulation instead of using the same money in R&D to develop new, compliant solutions.

Well, even if those arguments are rather poor, it is worrying that the discourse does now revolve around this question. Not only is it very difficult to define which financial information should be required for disclosure, the COMs position to leave companies much flexibility as possible risks to blur the whole argument itself. If it is not prescribed exactly how to measure the numbers required, the data is not comparable and rather worthless. Though even more important is the fact that the speaker could only refer to peer pressure arguments as he responded to the question why the register is not compulsory or why the voluntary register does not have better incentives to register. Indeed also the exclusion argument (i.e. a compulsory register would put non Brussels based organisations at an disadvantage) does not hold, because it is entirely a procedural question i.e. one could offer a fast track registration for interest that seek for the first time contact with institution and that are not based in Brussels.

Thus, even if the lobby ecosystem depends to a large extend on the individual companies reputation (which serves a vital precondition to operate), it is questionable if the register will create a sufficiently powerful social dynamic to effectively “force” companies to register. We’ll see next year, the register is expected to open in spring 2008.

berlaymonster blog

2007-07-15T00:28:00.000+02:00

While staying here in Brussels, doing some field research in the nitty-gritty details of technology policy making in the EU, i came across a number of things that some people call the EU ecosystem in Brussels. Since this ecosystem is a hugely important stage for all issues addressed here, a lot needs to be said about this example of jargon, but first - as an appetiser - see this blog as one of the best examples of the cyberspace part of this ecosystem > Berlaymonster

inner dynamics of bureaucracies

2007-06-14T23:47:00.000+02:00

Large bureaucracies are very complex organizations. Indeed, in terms of procedures, inner workings and resistance to change this is well known. But astonishingly, these complexities have a very serious impactl on the output capabilities of such an organization. This is to say, not only the individual motivation of employees is important (and because of their numbers and complex interdependencies really difficult to measure) but also the difference between levels of an organization. The cognitive distance between political management level and case officer/policy developer can be immense even though people work on the same issue/topic. One of the most important reasons for the distance is the variation in timelines/differences in timing considerations. Those are related to fundamental employment or term durations, but affect essentially every decision, especially those related to tactic and strategic planning. Essentially, the same issue/topic can not mean the same thing for employees on different level of a large organization or bureaucracy i.e. neither in administrations nor in private organizations.

expertise requirements in policy making

2007-04-12T23:48:00.000+02:00

One of the fundamental questions regarding the need for information input into policy making processes is that of the assumed correlation between administrative resources and the need for outside information. In a nutshell, this assumption says: because the Commission is a small administration that lack administrative resources it has a greater need for external expertise than – for instance – Member States governments. Thus, the Commission is supposed to be more receptive for lobbying efforts. This assumption, though compelling, certainly needs to be validated under a perspective of a general enquiry into the expertise requirements in policy making.

reframing

2007-03-17T00:07:00.000+01:00

Reframing of issues in new contexts is a fundamental process in policy making. Interest frame are aggregated and integrated in policy processes, hence the cognitive environment of an issues changes. This change affects basically everyone involved – or rather: everyone who follows the current developments of a specific topic. Thus on a private level, the reframing phenomenon can be seen as related to the personal intellectual stamina, i.e. do I follow a new way of looking at an issue or do I stay with my preconceived opinion (possibly in the face a mounting conflicting evidence)? However, in public such a reframing event is related to the intellectual reputation of an individual, i.e. referring to the question: do I want to be regarded as an innovative mind or do I stick to defending “old thinking”.

Hence, a reframing event puts actors in of an intellectual environment under pressure to adapt to the new frame, provided the reframing event is staged in a public forum that guarantees enough attention underpinned by a sufficient opinion leader-reputation.

“windows of opportunity” and “policy frames”

2007-02-18T16:18:00.000+01:00

The question of the relationship between “windows of opportunity” and “policy frames” is an especially interesting one, because by answering it one has to bridge the difference between two perspectives on the policy process.

One the one hand, windows of opportunity suggests a chronological dimension of the policy process, whereby different institutional events and circumstances coincide to open the window (Kingdon’s “streams”) that stays open until the establishing circumstances change.

On the other hand, policy frames are cognitive constructions that can or cannot come into being in relation to real-life circumstances, but refer to a certain interpretation of reality that as such is stable over time. Thus, a frame can be preserved even if the circumstances that triggered its construction change.

Taken together the following relationship between both terms is adequate:

Whereas windows of opportunity offer the chance to use a certain policy solution/concept in order to solve a problem in a particular time und specific circumstances, policy frames are a lasting argumentative windows that interprets reality in favour of certain policy solution/concept to solve the problem. A policy frame manifests itself to a window of opportunity in Kingdon’s sense as soon as a sufficient number of relevant people in the policy discourse accept the frames interpretation of reality as a cognitive basis to act upon.

political strategies as policy frames

2006-12-02T15:37:00.000+01:00

The EU Commission fairly regularly publishes broad policy strategies that address specific societal concerns and define policy priorities accordingly. There are numerous examples for this among the current activities of the EU policy-maker. One could argue that the common market itself – and hence important parts of the political system – originates from such a strategy as formulated in the 1985 White Paper "Completing the Internal Market".
One interesting aspect of such strategies is the fact that they function as a frame of references for subsequent policies. However, the mechanism how this works is rather complicated.
(1) Strategies are derived from prior policies or rather the implementatory experiences of prior policies. Thus, one could think of them as a stock-taking and bundling exercise with regard to prior activities.
In addition, (2) strategies have a future oriented feature, by assessing future developments and the associated needs. That is, stock-taking and drawing lessons from prior experiences and then bundling activities to address the challenges that result from such an exercise.
Such a strategy (3) then defines the priorities in a policy field and proposes activities that should be undertaken to meet the challenges identified in the strategy. Thus, a cause or rational is created to achieve specific goals by specific means.
After such a strategy is adopted, subsequent policies and the strategy in the field stand in an interactive relationship to each other. On the one hand are specific policies necessary to implement the strategy. On the other hand the strategy defines what policies can be proposed and which goals should be pursued.
Hence, the question is: Are strategies instrumental in defining the content of subsequent policies, or do political strategies provide only the rational and the political justification for one sort of policies to be advanced rather than another one?
The answer seems to be related to two broader questions, namely: How are societal problems introduced in political systems? And: What is the relationship between the perception of a societal problem and the selection of policies to address it?

two aspects of successful politics

2006-11-29T17:03:00.000+01:00

There are at least two different notions of success in the political system of the EU. One kind is more “political” and media/attention savvy, the other is more “policy-oriented” and results-focused. What does this mean?
Politicians need successes to justify their work. Either those successes come from long-term developments e.g. the results of an implemented policy or from short term attention in the media or among political elites. The problem is that timelines are not necessarily fair, meaning a policy built and implemented under a certain politicians watch may well deliver its success-results to the politician’s successor. Thus, politicians have to make sure that they get successes in their term of office.
Policy-makers on the other hand depend on long term successes to proof their competence and to underpin their reputations. Certainly the underlying social process does not involve the same kind of people, e.g. only experts in a certain policy field can assess a policy-maker’s reputation and only if they know the field long enough to oversee the policy making timeline. In order to safeguard such a long term approach to success-results, led victories are to be exploited or can even be seen only in hindsight.
Therefore: the difference between success-result timelines complicates the relationship between the political and the administrative level in the COM.

COM consultations a pivotal sphere of interaction

2006-10-17T23:26:00.000+02:00

The COM depends to an important extend on outside expert knowledge to draft policy proposals. That is, interests have to be consulted prior and during the process of developing a policy. One of the main reasons are the COM’s limited resources in comparison to its responsibility for the internal market and the often highly specialized and technical policy fields it is has to deal with. Although the there are recruitment schemes where experts work within the COM on a temporary basis, specialized expertise is generally a scarce resource with in the COM.
Therefore the COM has to make contact with outside experts and interest groups in order to assess the empirical realties (= the different perceptions ) of the societal problem at hand. This can be done in a variety of ways, such as genuine research approaches, information requests, or informal/personal contacts. However the more concrete a policy proposal gets the more relevant is the process of communication with stakeholders. The interaction between both sides becomes most visible if a public consultation is launched and stakeholders are called upon to respond to questions/statements in a consultation document.
A directory of ongoing and closed consultations can be found on the following webpage:

Your Voice in Europe - Home - Consultations

company interests and discursive policy making

2006-10-08T15:45:00.000+02:00

In an interview with a Brussels-based representative of a leading energy company, we discussed several important aspects of the communication process that links private interests and the COM.

In general he stressed the importance of Eurogroups that is European industry associations that are in direct contact with EU institutions. Those organisations function as communication platform on which a wide range of relevant contacts are cultivated and maintained. Eurogroups have multilingual staffs that make contacts especially to MEPs easier to develop; long standing experiences are also an important asset.
With respect to the specific policy area, where his company has vested interests, a cooperative working relationship has been established. Industry organises informal working groups to which policy officers from the COM are invited. The working groups serve as informal discussion forums where ideas can be discussed freely and opinions openly expressed. Invitations are personalized, no substitutes are allowed which makes the working group a trust based informal working relationships.
Since such relationships depend on personal contacts, it is important to nurture the relationship with COM officials, which includes the continuation of contacts even if an official is transferred to another post. In order to get the most out of the working group meetings it is also important be aware of the developments in the COM. Thus, one needs a network of personal contacts the build-up of which takes at least 12 months.
However, because those working groups are a permanent institution, there are no official COM publications that contain surprises for stakeholders. Policy proposals and political initiatives are effectively developed in dialogue between both sides. The subject of the cooperation is the “factual core” of a given policy.
In the light of our inquiry, this constitutes evidence that the development of a common understanding of a societal problem is an essential aspect of the process ob interest intermediation in the EU.
Another important hint toward the nature of this process can be drawn from his assertion that there are policy trends that need to be taken into account if the particular interests are to be advances in those communicative networks of actors. He mentioned the concept of “security of energy supplies” as a recent case in the point that constitutes a new frame under which particular interests have to be redefined and communicated. Such a redefinition of company interests can even reflect back into the company and raise the awareness for new possible business opportunities.
Hence, under the theoretical lens, the question arises how a companies particular interests are defined vis-à-vis the policy making process in the EU.

black box and source of information

2006-10-07T20:19:00.000+02:00

For stakeholders the COM represents both a black box and a vital source of information. For representatives in Brussels the knowledge what the COM plans is a basic resource and since, especially with respect to future activities, it resembles a black box, some kind of an early alert is important to reduce the structural uncertainty of this situation.
Early alerts can be retrieved through personal contact and working relationships with officials. Because the question of how those contacts can be established is the subject of another post, we can here ask: What is the value of such an early alert?
First of all, retrieved from a personal contact the alert equals preliminary information on the internal policy agenda in the COM. The reliability of such information depends on the quality of the personal contact. Assuming that it is sufficiently reliable, the fact that it is early gives an actor a competitive edge to form an opinion and to develop a position toward a policy proposal. This value diminishes if the preliminary information is widely circulated among actors who are affected by the proposal. Early alert information is therefore not regularly shared among actors.
It is also important to note, that generally an existing interest in the subject is an perquisite for a early alert. Either an actor knows what to ask for or – more likely – a commission official know what a contact is interested in and offers information “that might be of interest to you”. Which then leads to the question, what benefits are in for an officials that distributes information?

discursive politics and the role of politicians I

2006-09-23T21:57:00.000+02:00

Politics is a discursive process. At its heart the process consists of actors in the political system who take up problems/ issues, which are dealt with in other subsystems such as the economy, and frame it as a political problem. In doing so, a political debate is launched in which the political problem is discussed, or to be more precise, solutions for the political problem are discussed. Since a politician can only to a certain extend control the progress of such a debate, and is most probably not an expert, who can propose a solution for the problem, taking part in the debate is a politicians main interest. Given his role in determine the political systems response to the political problem the primary concern of taking part in the debate is worrying for anyone who is affected by the societal problems implication and would like to have it fixed asap. This is all the more relevant if we take into account the fact that there are usually more than one proposed solutions to a political problem. Each of the solutions might be favoured by different actors who may or may not themselves take part in the political debate.

Recap:

Politicians frame political problems in order to debate a solution
A politicians main concern is to take part in such a debate
Affected actors would like the problem solved
There are more than one solutions to a given problem, and those solutions have different effects for actors
Politicians are in charge of choosing a solution

a response, part III / ETI

2006-09-03T21:17:00.000+02:00

Response to the “European Transparency Initiative” as presented by the European Commission on May 3, 2006

Response to Section II “Transparency and Interest Representation (Lobbying)”

Question 3
Question 4
Final Recommendation

. 4

Question 3

Do you agree to consolidate the existing codes of conduct with a set of common requirements? Who do you think should write the code?

Reviewing the current situation of the various “codes of conduct” adopted by umbrella organisations of professionals in Brussels, the Green Paper states that:

Up to now no cases of misdemeanour have been reported in the context of these voluntary codes of conduct. Another important point to note is that only consultants adhere to such codes. Neither lobbyists who are permanent employees of interest groups nor other groups of interest representatives who occasionally engage in lobbying activities (e.g. law firms and think-tanks) fall within the scope of such voluntary codes of conduct. Compared to the whole lobbying community in Brussels, the coverage of the voluntary codes has consequently been limited. Furthermore, as the current system relies on self-discipline it appears necessary to consolidate the existing codes and put in place a common enforcement and sanction system trusted by all. This could include a common code of conduct, applicable to all lobbyists, monitored by a special umbrella organisation and possibly coupled with a Commission-led registration system. It has also been suggested that the EU institutions should be willing to impose formal sanctions on any lobbyist breaking the code of conduct.

Since a registration system needs to encompass all actors involved in lobbying the European institutions its inherent principles for consultation and participation are the basis upon which a common set of minimum requirements has to be built.

Because the participation of civil society in decision-making processes delivers mutual benefits to all participants, we agree that it is an important task to formulate those principles and minimum requirements in the format of a common code of ethics.

Such a code of ethics would equally apply to all actors involved. It should on the one hand relate to staff regulations within the institutions and on the other hand to codes of conduct of the respective associations or umbrella organisations.

The process used to develop a common code is as important as the code itself. A review of the codes developed by the different professional societies (AALEP, SEAP, EPACA)

could be as useful as a summary of requirements derived from staff regulations and consultation principles to provide a starting point.

A committee of practitioners from all sides should then be summoned to formulate a common code of ethics which in turn could then be incorporated into the different codes of conduct. A distinction between code of ethics and codes of conduct is of major importance, because the overall ethical principles of the collaboration between institutions and civil society need to be uniformly accepted. While codes of conduct, although to be written within the guidelines of the code of ethic, may be specified and tailored to serve different groups of actors who might have a different self-conception of their respective role in the process.

Such a code of conduct should in our view among other things demand that lobbyists:

specify the identity of his/her clients and the goal of their actions to the EU public office holder;
do not encourage an EU public office holder to disobey the rules of conduct he/she is expected to observe;
avoid putting undue (exaggerated, abusive) pressure on an EU public office holder;
ensure the accuracy and validity of the information given;
respect the public’s right to have correct information in any of its communication aimed at influencing public opinion;
avoid making false or misleading statements to an EU public office holder or lead anyone into error or purpose;
take the public interest into account when making statements;
act with professionalism, honesty and integrity;
avoid placing himself/herself in a conflict of interest or representing clients with
competing or divergent interests without the permission of the people whose interests are at stake;

Question 4

Do you agree that a new inclusive external watchdog is needed to monitor compliance and that sanctions should be applied for any breach of the code?

With regard to our views on question 3, the answer to questions 4 needs to be qualified.

First of all, for a code of ethics, monitoring compliance is difficult since un-ethical actions are not necessarily apparent. Furthermore, the proposed code of ethics serves as an overall ethical standard for all conduct and therefore for the different codes of conduct of different groups of actors and stakeholders.

Thus a distinction is needed:

1. Compliance with the code of ethics…

…needs to be “monitored” by each and every person involved on either side of civil society consultation and participation in the political process of the European Union. In cases of unethical behaviour sanctions can only be applied by a process of “naming and shaming”. Since his or her reputation is the prime asset for each lobbyist, such a sanction mechanism is sufficient and may be strengthened by the establishment of a pillory. The pillory should be governed by an impartial and independent authority, which ensures that denunciations are only published if a complainant reveals his/her identity. The same would also apply for officials, who might face press coverage as well.

2. Compliance with the provisions of the registration system…

…needs to be monitored by the management authority of the registration system according to applicable regulations and connected services. Sanctions need to be defined by the institutions which use the registration system. Enforcement of sanctions also depends on the service and/or right which is granted upon registering and thus can only be done by the respective institution. A close cooperation between the institutions and the managing authority is therefore needed. Albeit, sanctions can only be enforced by the institution affected by the violation of the provisions.

3. Compliance with the code of conduct of a certain group…

…needs to be monitored by the respective group itself. Within the proposed framework, self-regulatory system of monitoring and sanctioning are sufficient. The code of ethics and the registration system provide for a sufficient behavioural corset for anyone who wants to be a reliable and responsible participant in the political process. Group-based codes of conduct thus are of great importance for the self-conception of different groups so that monitoring and credible enforcement mechanisms are in their own self interest. In addition groups should be encouraged to document their rules and procedures for public scrutiny and comparison in a common location, such as the online registration database or a related webpage run by its management authority.

In addition to the hitherto stated views, we would strongly support the constitution of a new impartial independent and non-profit organisation committed to enhance transparency and democracy.

As mentioned in the introduction, we regard the “European Transparency Initiative” as a valuable starting point to improve the public image of our profession. But it is just that – a beginning.

To expect the Commission to be able to solve this important problem borders on wishful thinking. How can the actors involved with representing interests raise the public perception of their business solely by being subjected to governmental regulations?

As valuable as the current discussions among stakeholders are now is the time to go one step further. Whatever the results of the consultation and indeed what the ETI will look like in a few years, there is a clear need for something lasting and firmly based within the European civil society: an impartial independent non-profit organisation committed to enhance transparency and democracy in the European Union.

We therefore urge every citizen committed to legitimacy of interest representation toward political institutions and the transparency of the political process to join our effort to establish a European Foundation for Transparency and Democracy (EFTD). And we call upon the stakeholders to support the EFTD in its endeavour to

support the European integration process by raising awareness for its uniqueness and complexity;
serve the European citizens by advancing the knowledge about governance structures and processes on the European level;
establish a civil society Foundation from citizens for citizens, independent from the EU institutions;
build a permanent body to address issues of transparency in the EU in an impartial independent manner for European citizens.

The EFTD’s activities should be underwritten by donations and endorsed by the European institutions. One of the first activities of the EFTD should be the launch its web page as a multi-lingual portal serving as a gateway for anyone who seeks information about lobbying in the European Union.

Initially the portal should pursue a two-tier approach: directory & information portal. It should serve as premier of source of information about EU-level interest mediation written by scientists, practitioners and stakeholders, all of which will be subjected to an open system of peer-review via a forum application.

The directory should contain a structured overview and short abstracts for the large amount of web resources of information concerning the process of interest mediation in the EU, both from within and outside the EU institutions.

Final Recommendation

Lobbying activities should be public, transparent and, above all disclosed in a central register.

We do not see any problem in opening up the activities of lobbyists to public scrutiny.

A coherent multilevel regulatory framework can serve as a guide to lobbying for citizens and citizens groups, thus contributing - as a real catalyst – to opening up and broadening access to law-makers.

We recommend an approach which sees regulation as the beginning of a process which will help to reinvigorate democracy to the extent that it widens participation and demystifies commercial lobbying activity.

A centralized register would provide a public record of information about people and organisations shaping public policy at EU level. At present, the principles of openness and transparency that the European Institutions embrace lack a coherent concrete form and the present registers and databases are insufficient.

A register of lobbyists and their clients would be a very effective way of auditing the activities of outside interests who seek to influence policy making. One of the recurrent problems in trying to understand the nature and scope of lobbying activity has been the absence of any reliable data on what lobbyists actually do, and what resources are devoted to influencing policy.

The drawbacks of regulations are, in our opinion, more imagined than real. There is evidence from the United States and Canada that registration systems can be administered easily and efficiently, especially in electronic form, which has the advantage of being relatively cheap and accessible. There certainly is a concern in some places (such as the US) that the systems of regulation in place are subject to loopholes and that corporations and lobbyists have found ways to get round them. In our view this is only an argument for having more, not less, effective regulation.

For a central registration scheme to have the full confidence of the public, the European Parliament, and the lobbying community, it should be administered by an independent authority such as the European Ombudsman.

The fundamental issue at stake here is the question of our democracy and how it operates. That democracy must be seen to be transparent and open and anyone who wishes to discover the identity of a person lobbying in favour or against should be able to do so by consulting the register of lobbyists.

Lobbying is a good aspect of the political process and it must be regulated. Unfortunately the Commission Green Paper shows only inconclusive commitment to introduce real legislation in this area. In all professions people do their business openly and they are subject to regulation. Part and parcel of the development of any profession is that it goes down the path of regulation.

We are not advocating draconian measures to demonise or penalise people engaged in the lobbying profession nor are we proposing burdensome bureaucratic measures. What we are proposing is to put in place structures and principles of conduct.

Professional lobbyists have nothing to fear about revealing who they are, whom they represent and why they are lobbying. It is after all both in the public interest and for the future development of the profession.

List of signatories

a response, part II / ETI

2006-09-03T21:14:00.000+02:00

Response to the “European Transparency Initiative” as presented by the European Commission on May 3, 2006

Response to Section II “Transparency and Interest Representation (Lobbying)”

Question 2

Do you agree that lobbyists who wish to be automatically alerted to consultations by the EU institutions should register and provide information, including on their objectives, financial situation and on the interests they represent? Do you agree that this information should be made available to the general public? Who do you think should manage the register?

In order to achieve “effective and proportionate” measures in the field of transparency we consider a registrations system as an indispensable tool. However, since such a system is aimed to (1) provide transparency for European citizens of a (2) highly sophisticated sector of policy experts working on very specific topics, a consultation alert service seems to be an inadequate incentive. Anyone who is an expert working in a policy field certainly doesn’t need to be alerted to a consultation published on “Your Voice in Europe” while interested citizens already appreciate the alert service offered in order to keep track of policy developments in the European Union.

A register therefore poses the important question “How to get people to register”. According to the Commission’s proposal there would be:

A voluntary registration system, run by the Commission, with clear incentives for lobbyists to register. The register would include automatic alerts of consultations on issues of known interest to the lobbyists.

The question is: Can a voluntary registration system do the job?

To consider whether such a system can or cannot do the job requires a clear understanding of what the job is, as well as how existing registration systems work. The European Commission states the following as an essential component of a basic framework of understanding of the relation between EU institutions and lobbyists.

When lobby groups seek to contribute to EU policy development, it must be clear to the general public which input they provide to the European institutions. It must be clear also who they represent, what their mission is and how they are funded.

It follows that the question of which information must be provided in a registration system is probably more important than the question as to which incentives are used to get people to register. Secondly aiming at enhancing transparency in lobbying means that a registration system is not a goal in itself, whether it is compulsory or not.

Therefore a legitimate public interests of transparency needs to be balanced with a legitimate right of privacy for stakeholders. Certainly those considerations may be addressed with carefully worded information requirements. But even unfounded criticism toward built-in loopholes will undermine the purpose of the registration system.

A lasting assessment of which information need to be provide for the general public needs to be based on the Commission own requirements. By setting itself high standards of transparency in decision-making each Commission official has legitimate needs to know who is representing which interests. Those needs should be met in a registration system as a minimum requirement of information.

In order to keep such a registration system updated, each time a stakeholder participates in a consultation the information given should be reconfirmed and/or updated if necessary.

More importantly, since the registration system and its information requirements result from the Commission’s own commitment to transparency in policy making, it cannot be entirely voluntary to provide the respective information if one wants to participate in the political process. The responsibility of which comes with participation commands responsible stakeholders to provide the requested information. Thus a registration system would be the basis upon which access to the commission can be obtained. In turn it lies in the Commission’s own responsibility to live up to its own standards and to ensure that stakeholders are registered in a voluntary registration system.

Since the target of lobbying is for the most part the European Commission and the European Parliament, this means that we would have two registration systems: one applying to the European Commission (voluntary registration system) and another one applying to the European Parliament (non-voluntary registration system, since it is a condition for obtaining a badge)? Do we need two distinct registration systems?

Regarding the European Parliament: It is true that a register of accredited lobbyists is published on the EP website. As the Green Paper remarks it is simply an alphabetical list and it provides only the names of the badge holders and of the organisations they represent. It gives no indication of the interests for which a lobbyist is acting.

It is our view that one registration system should cover ALL European institutions as well as ALL actors involved in lobbying those institutions. Therefore an encompassing registration system, combining the CONNECS database approach and the accreditation system of the European Parliament, is the only credible option.

A central registration system would provide for a number of advantages: Stakeholders and officials alike would have an important information resource, to say the least. And it could provide the public with important information about the political process and increase public confidence in the EU institutions.

Moreover, an encompassing registration database does not mean every entry carries the same amount of information, nor does it mean that every information is needed from each person or organisation registered. Information provided would relate to a specific purpose, e.g. obtaining an entry badge for the Parliament building, submitting a contribution to consultation, etc.

Objections to a statutory register of outside interests tend to focus on the difficulty in defining lobbyists and the impracticality of maintaining a register of outside interests. If a statutory register of lobbyists includes all those who lobby, then the difficulty of distinguishing between different types of lobbyists (commercial consultants, in-house corporate, civil society, voluntary sector) becomes less problematic.

There is also evidence that these systems are practicable and they can make important information available to the public cheaply and effectively by electronic information gathering, storage and retrieval, providing easy access to all who wish it. It is inaccurate to claim that all statutory regulation is cumbersome and ineffective. In fact compared to the current situation of different databases and the need to state information over and over again, a central registration system can be expected to simplify the life of stakeholders.

A central registration system with a reachable and comprehensible user-friendly online database would help to improve the transparency of governance and accessibility of the EU institutions. But a registration system is not a panacea for all problems stated in the Green Paper. It is only the first step in ensuring sound standards in public life.

Given the importance of a registration system for the European institutions the question who should manage it is very important. Since it provides a dual-use function with offering valuable information for the institutions and the public, reliability and impartiality are the most important management principles. The information gathered and provided needs to be accurately stored and traceably logged so that changes and developments can be followed.

In order to guarantee the usability for the European Parliament and the European Commission a certain level of collaboration between both branches of the European polity is needed. Because the primary function of the registration system is to grant access to the decision-making processes on the European level the trust of citizens in the impartiality of a managing body is also needed. How should a governmental institution regulate the access to itself and building up the citizens trust?

Therefore a compromise needs to be found in order to allocate the management authority to neither of the two institutions themselves, but to a third one which enjoys the confidence of both the public and the institutions. We would endorse the installation of an independent managing body installed under the auspices of the European Ombudsman.

a response, part I / ETI

2006-09-01T20:59:00.000+02:00

As you know the European Commission held a public consultation on its European Transparency Initiative (ETI), which has been open until the end of August. Although I wasn't interested in participating in the consultation myself, I worked together with a friend of mine to draft a response to the questions tabled in the green paper.
We answered only the four questions in section II of the green paper and included some preliminary remarks before doing so:

Response to the “European Transparency Initiative” as presented by the European Commission on May 3, 2006

Response to Section II “Transparency and Interest Representation (Lobbying)”

Preliminary remarks
Question 1

. 2

Preliminary remarks

In the introduction to its Green Paper the European Commission stresses its commitment to the participation of civil society organisations and stakeholders in the policy process on the European level.

With regard to the openness as one guiding principle it states that:

At the same time, the Commission has stressed the principle that “with better involvement comes greater responsibility”. Relations between the Commission and interest representatives must be open to outside scrutiny. Therefore it was considered timely to review the framework for activities of interest representatives and seek views on the need for new initiatives.

We fully support the notion of responsibility which comes along with participation. As signatories of this position paper we strongly believe in the value of transparency.

Despite the fact that most actors involved in the current debates increasingly emphasise the importance of interest representation for the political process, most citizens perceive it as backroom procedures illegitimately altering policies for the benefit of powerful special interests. To address this discrepancy between self-assessment and public perception, the Commission’s effort to regulate its relationship with interest groups can be a helpful exercise and ought to be supported.

As signatories of this position paper we agree upon the following basic views with regard to the subject of the Green Paper:

1. We strongly believe in the legitimacy of lobbying and its impossible dissociation from the democratic process. Trying to influence the content of EU public policies or attempting to gain advantages from an established EU programme is a fundamental right based upon two basic EU freedoms: freedom of speech and freedom of association.

2. We strongly believe that for the sake of transparency ALL lobbying organisations (lobbying- public affairs consultants, management consultants and accountants, lawyers, NGOs, think tanks, corporate and trade associations) trying to influence EU policy makers and the content of EU public policies must be treated on an equal footing.

3. We accept that people have a right to know who is talking to policy makers and which organisations and individuals consider themselves stakeholders in a certain policy domain.

4. We would support the European Commission in an effort to extend the principles and rules of conduct under which its own staff works with other participants in the policy formulation and decision-making processes, notably those for the purpose of the Green Paper defined lobbyists.

Question 1

Do you agree that efforts should be made to bring greater transparency to lobbying?

Yes. A higher level of transparency will be beneficial for both the political process and the profession. The European Transparency Initiative points toward the right direction for it is the complexity and distance between Brussels and European citizens which lies at the heart of alienation and unfounded anxiety towards the EU.

Therefore while one has to applaud the Commission for emphasising the already achieved transparency of governance, existing measures need to be fine-tuned in order to draw the curtain for the often misinterpreted process of lobbying the European institutions.

policy networks bibliography

2006-08-10T21:06:00.000+02:00

A bibliography with policy networks literature. Prepared by Mariangela Petrizzo. Thank You!

Bibliografia sobre Policy Networks / Policy Networks Bibliography: "by Mariangela Petrizzo"

policy frames v. interests

2006-08-08T00:31:00.000+02:00

Policy frames and interests - both terms are interrelated. Policy frames are the reflection of a particular interest in terms of an action justification.
If political problems are dealt with in societies, different view points (= interest regarding an issue/question) compete with each other. The competition takes place in form of different/conflicting action formulas prescribed by interested parties in order to solve/deal with the problem. In order to justify the viability of a certain action formula a convincing story is needed as to convince others that the action formula ought to be applied. To be convincing, such a justification story needs to take the context and other perspectives on the problem into account. Thus, a policy frame is needed as a quasi connection of ones particular interest with other interests related to the problem in question.

Frame Analysis

2006-07-16T22:19:00.000+02:00

This webpage offers a very concise introduction into the main areas of research where frames and frame analysis' are used.

Frame Analysis

An insider’s perspective

2006-07-08T17:33:00.000+02:00

If one wants to know more about communications processes and independencies, well-informed journalist are vital source of information for a researcher. I am fortunate to have had the chance to discuss the issues followed in this blog with one of the most knowledgeable journalists about lobbying in the EU, who in addition has more than 15 years of experience in Brussels.

The EP

In his opinion is it way to much to ask of the EP to cope with the increasingly complicated matters of EU policy making. The primary reason for this inability is the incompetence of its scientific service and the lack of specialized expertise. This leads to a situation where MEPs charged with a report depend on outside expertise to fulfil their duties. In the more established policy areas, such outside expertise is provided in form of additional staff, which is paid via consulting contracts by vested interests. Also, being a lawyer by training is beneficial for an MEP because he than in not obliged to reveal his clients. Those clients on the other hand might well be related to a burning political interest of the same MEP in particular detailed political questions.
Since we already know that personal contacts are important, the above assessment leads to the a reminder that contacts and connections often are based on loyalty networks and dependencies.

The COM

If one compares the current situation with the situation before the “Kinnock-Reforms” had been pursued, individual COM officials are nowadays more insecure. The reason is the new staff evaluation system, which presumably cripples motivation and leads to insecurity. As observed by my contact, COM officials are increasingly interested in gaining recognition outside the COM.
In terms of policy making, a higher dependency on allies characterizes the COMs political initiatives. This in turn increases the chances for lobbies to influence policy initiatives.

Personal networks

Communication networks in Brussels work on three different levels. It is not only EU-Speak, the jargon of policy people, but rather a phenomenon that may be described as triple speak. It depends on the level of knowledge a listener has, if he understands only the openly expressed jargon message or the sub-textual messages referring to the network of interests or the personal relationships concerned.
Especially the personal level of communication seems to be important in an environment where most of the actors are expatriates that share similar private activities, such as school for children, sport, etc.

a virtual tour of the lobby capital (as they call it)

2006-06-24T00:11:00.000+02:00

There are many lobbyists, but there is also a vibrant community of lobby-critics. In terms of lobbying in the EU, the Amsterdam-based think tank Corporate Europe Observatory is probably the most active anti-lobbying organisation. A couple of weeks ago CEO launched a new web service offering the possibility to take a virtual tour thru the EU quarter in Brussels.

http://www.eulobbytours.org/tour.html

a letter to lobbyists / ETI

2006-06-12T20:46:00.000+02:00

Back in February 2006 a friend of mine and I wrote a letter to a number leading actors in the Brussels lobbying circus. As you can see in the following, we tried to come up with an innovative approach to issues discussed in course of the preparation of Siim Kallas' "European Transparency Initiative" consultation (which is open now, until Aug. 31).

Proposal for a non-profit non-governmental transparency organisation for Europe
(06.02.2006)

In recent months we’ve witnessed a growing effort on part of the Commission to address the problem of vanishing trust in the European institutions by European citizens. Triggered by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands a widespread uncertainty about the reasons is being matched with different attempts to improve the overall situation without forestalling a debate over the future institutional structure of the EU. Among the most prominent efforts are the Commission's Plan D, the "White Paper on a European Communication Policy" and it's European Transparency Initiative.

While knowledge and interest in the European integration is nowadays a rather scarce resource among citizens, it seems at least questionable how debate and dialogue – as laudable the idea is – could improve the citizens’ trust in the EU. Especially communication strategies and PR efforts by the Commission will probably raise the suspicion of citizens as being subjected to a concerted whitewash operation from politicians and bureaucrats in the "space station" Brussels.

Commissioner Kallas' European Transparency Initiative on the other hand points toward the right direction for it is the complexity and distance between Brussels and European citizens which lies at the heart of alienation and unfounded anxiety toward the EU. Therefore one has to applaud Commissioner Kallas for his courageous attempt to emphasise the already achieved transparency of governance and draw the curtain for the often misinterpreted process of lobbying the European institutions.

Despite the fact that all actors involved unceasingly emphasise the importance of interest representation for the political process, most citizens perceive it as backroom procedures illegitimately altering policies for the benefit of powerful special interests. To address this discrepancy between self-assessment and public perception, the Commissions effort to regulate its relationship with interest groups ought to be supported. But to expect the Commission to be able to solve this important problem borders on wishful thinking. How should a governmental institution regulate the access to itself and building up the citizens trust? How would the citizens be enabled to know who represents what interests to whom if each institution has its own regulations for it? And most importantly, how can the actors involved with representing interests raise the public perception of their business by being subjected to governmental regulations?

As valuable as the current discussions among stakeholder are - and will be once the ETI green paper has been published in mid March - now is the time to go one step further. It is likely that the Commission eventually will come to terms with a suitable solution, but will a compromise achieve the goal? Whatever the compromises will look like, there is a clear need for something lasting and firmly based within the European civil society: an impartial independent non-profit organisation committed to enhance transparency and democracy in the European Union.

We therefore urge every citizen committed to legitimacy of interest representation toward political intuitions and the transparency of the political process to join our effort to establish the European Foundation for Transparency and Democracy (EFTD). And we call upon the stakeholders to support the EFTD in its endeavour to

• support the European integration process by raising awareness for its uniqueness and complexity;

• serve the European citizens by advancing the knowledge about governance structures and processes on the European level;

• establish a civil society Foundation from citizens for citizens, independent from the EU-Institutions;

• build a permanent body to address issues of transparency in the EU in an impartial independent manner for the public to know.

The EFTD’s activities will be underwritten by donations, which will be up to public scrutiny. Initially the foundation will engage in two activities: that is establishing a European Council for Transparency (ECT) and building a web portal dedicated to its cause.

The ECT will be a publicly elected council of high-level Experts in European Affairs dedicated to improve transparency and the dialogue between organisations, institutions and EU-citizens. Consisting off scientists, representatives of European level associations, NGOs and the European civil society, the ECT is meant to encompass a well-balanced group of EU stakeholders, but neither serving MEPs nor active civil servants of EU Institutions.

The web portal Eulobby.net will be re-launched as a multi-lingual portal serving as a gateway for anyone who seeks information about lobbying in the European Union initially pursuing a triple-play approach: directory – register – information portal. It will serve as premier source of information on EU-level interest mediation by scientists, practitioners and stakeholders, all of which will be subjected to an open system of peer-review via a forum application.
The eulobby.net directory will contain a structured overview and short abstracts for the large amount of web resources of information concerning the process of interest mediation in the EU, both from within and outside the EU institutions. Its register will list all institutions, groups, firms and individuals who are engaged in the legitimate process of representing special interests at the EU-level.

EP lobbying

2006-05-14T14:39:00.000+02:00

Talking to a long standing MEP who had served in many senior positions including that of the EP president about lobbying practices, I expected hear a rather rosy picture regarding influence of lobbyists on the decision making process in the EP. This expectation is to be kept in mind in order to put his answers in the context of our inquiry.

First of all he clearly stated that different interests regarding a policy are perfectly legitimate and that it is the core task for politicians to find compromises between the camps. In the EP the political groups are the most important level for those compromises. Because institutional factors make a large majority in the assembly necessary, a compromise between the two biggest groups is a powerful preliminary decision. Once such a compromise is reached, lobbyists have no more the opportunity to exert influence.
However, before the process reaches this stage, lobbyist and associations are an important “sounding board” to test the viability of policy proposals and political initiatives. Early information is thus of mutual benefit for MEPs and lobbyists. If a lobbyist is “good” her policy positions evolve through the process stages, following the debate in the EP/groups. Hence, the better a lobbyist knows the process stages; the higher are her chances to exert influence in the right moment. Asked if such well informed lobbyist could be capable of anticipating the eventually involving political compromise, my interview partner denied anyone outside the EP the capability. But this opinion probably reflects more the self assertion of a long standing MEP, than the reality of lobbying towards the EP.

policy making in the EP

2006-05-08T13:37:00.000+02:00

The importance of the European Parliament for the EU policy making process is growing. This observation is shared between researchers and practitioners. One dimension of this development is the inter-institutional working relationship between Council, COM and EP. With respect to the growing importance of the EP, one can think of it as a competition over influence that is reflected in recent attempts to modernise the Treaty and Constitutional Treaty respectively.

At the beginning of this year I had the opportunity to interview a long standing MEP who had served in many senior positions including that of the EP president. With respect to the inter-institutional relationship he mentioned the regular and compulsory meetings between the COM and the heads of the political groups in the EP as focal point. Although single MEPs also talk to the COM, it is only an incumbent on meetings with the heads of the fractions. Those EP-COM meetings proceed in a professional atmosphere, where both institutions asses the others thinking about policy proposals. In general, he said, COM and EP are aligned against the Council in favouring a community approach. With COM in regular contact with administrations in the MS, the EP leadership coordinates its political approach closely with the Council Presidency. In addition to their constituencies, MEPs also are in regular contacts with societal groups via events or receptions.

personal contacts

2006-04-13T21:57:00.000+02:00

A long time representative in Brussels confirmed the theoretical deduction that personal contacts are the most important basis for interest representation and the acquisition of information.
Contacts are based on previous working relationships or social factors such as nationality, language, job, etc. When talking to COM officials, detailed questions that leave the impression of being well informed are a key to precise information as well as further background information. Previous knowledge serves as an admission ticket. Equally important is a justified reason for a specific question, what is the information for?
If both conditions are observed, COM officials are usually willing to provide information. Not at least, because the COM has an interest in being perceived as a cooperative partner.
It is also important to cultivate connections and personal contacts. In relations between administrations, it is often the case that contacts made in a political meeting between high level officials can be developed into fruitful working relationships between administrators, which can be useful later on.
In general, the job of a Brussels representative resembles that of an translator between different organisational cultures and interest. It is his job to see the big picture which shows overlapping areas between the two.

Another representative confirmed those appreciations and added that one needs at least six month to build up the necessary contacts if specialized in one or two policy areas. The quality of a working relationship with COM officials depends on the duration, the longer the contact the better the results. Each long term working relationship needs also a personal level.
Apart from basic interpersonal factors, institutional factors also have an influence on the quality of information retrievable through personal contacts. A gauging factor in the eyes of the COM is ones institutional capabilities to influence the policy process. It makes a difference if an actor represents an administration from the member states or private interests. But the difference is not clear cut black or white, that is to say a MS administration can also be an obstacle for COM plans and therefore be not necessarily privileged over other interests. Especially consultants often enjoy a good supply of privileged information because they are seen as being more flexible and only indirectly representing vested interests.

personal contacts & NGOs

2006-04-07T22:09:00.000+02:00

To get information early enough to be able to react or develop a position is an essential task for people representing NGOs that work for more communal/diverse interests such as the environment, human rights, and consumer interests.
With regard to the COM, personal contacts on the working level are the primary source of information. In addition to general features of those contacts, the communication channel is also of importance. Most effective are acroamatic requests in comparison to written requests via e-mail or letter. The reason is traceability of information leaks, which is to say: if one represents common interest with which COM officials privately sympathize, more information are available, but not in a traceable format. Another option is to “ask” the COM via other more sympathetic actors in the political system, such as MEPs.
Another difference is the general sympathy for such common interests in respective DG’s, appreciation differs according to the policy area. Because common concerns are rather cross cutting in nature, it is often the case that actors deal with the same contact person in a variety of cases, which increases the probability to achieve a working relationship even if on the face of it that would not be very likely. But if a DG is sympathetic, officials provide early information and hints in order to be able to rely on well timed consumer or environmentalist statements/positions.
In general many actors benefit from regular conversations and run circles where a exchange of views is possible between actors from different sides of the opinion spectrum, such as industry associations and consumer organisations.

political officials v. administrative officials

2006-03-16T22:05:00.000+01:00

There are different levels in the European Commission in terms of officials.
As far as policy making is concerned we need to differentiate between a political level and a administrative level. On the political level an official’s objective is the political performance of the EC or a particular Commissioner/DG. On the administrative level officials are concerned with the factual relevance and problem solving capabilities of concrete proposals. Those differences need to be taken into account when opinions and statements of COM officials are referred to.

policy definition I

2006-03-15T17:44:00.000+01:00

As stated earlier I define policy as a solution for a societal problem. To be more specific one would have to concede a proposed or attempted solution, since success or even implementation is a different matter.
But for the moment my focus lies on the other part of the definition: societal problem. Does that mean a problem for everyone in a society? Most likely not for everyone, at least not initially (because in the long run a problem not solved might grow in its importance and eventually affect the society as a whole). If we take Europe (or any other democratic society) as an example, it is likely that a majority of citizens is possibly affected by the problem. Or rather one has to say affected by the possible consequences of a problem. Further more we need to be aware that those possible consequences lie in the future. Which is to say (a majority of) citizens have to perceive those consequences as a valid assumption of the future.
Therefore a policy is a solution for societal problem of which a majority of citizens think that its consequences if not solved will affect them.

a proposal / ETI

2006-02-20T19:55:00.000+01:00

Concept for a non-profit non-governmental transparency organisation for Europe
(19.01.2006)

EFTD European Foundation for Transparency and Democracy

The EFTD is an impartial independent non-profit foundation committed to enhance transparency and democracy in the European Union.
The EFTD is dedicated to the cooperation among the peoples, states and citizens in Europe. The EFTD supports the European integration process by raising awareness for its uniqueness and complexity.
The EFTD strives to serve the European citizens by advancing the knowledge about governance structures and processes on the European level.
The EFTD is a civil society foundation from citizens for citizens, independent from the EU-Institutions.
The EFTD’s activities will be underwritten by donations, which will be up to public scrutiny.

ECT – European Council for Transparency

The ECT is a council of high-level experts in European affairs dedicated to improve transparency and the dialogue between organisations, institutions and EU-citizens.
The ECT consists of scientists, representatives of European level associations, NGOs and the European civil society.
The ECT is meant to encompass a well-balanced group of EU stakeholders but not serving MEPs nor active civil servants of EU Institutions.
ECT Members are appointed by the EFTD for a one-year term.
The ECT annually elects a chairperson by a two third majority among its members.

Eulobby.net

Eulobby.net will be re-launched as a multi-lingual portal serving as a gateway for anyone who seeks information about lobbying in the European Union.
Eulobby.net will initially pursue a triple-play approach: directory – register – information portal.
The eulobby.net directory will contain a structured overview and short abstracts for the large amount of web resources of information concerning the process of interest mediation in the EU, both from within and outside the EU institutions.
The eulobby.net register will list all institutions, groups, firms and individuals who are engaged in the legitimate process of representing special interests at the EU-level.
The eulobby.net information portal will serve as premier source of information on EU-level interest mediation by scientists, practitioners and stakeholders, all of which will be subjected to an open system of peer-review via a forum application.

EFTD General Secretariat

The EFTD will set up a general secretariat (GC) in order to run eulobby.net, to serve as a supporting office for the ECT and its chairperson as well as the HQ of the Foundation itself.
The general secretariat (GC) will be run by the EFTD secretary general, who will be appointed by the EFTD.
The GC will coordinate and organise the work of the EFTD.

a secretive sphere

2006-01-07T18:03:00.000+01:00

A while ago I witnessed a closed meeting of representatives of EU member states with a high-ranking COM official scheduled to get background information concerning the coming policy initiative from the COM. After the presentation the subject of the conversation changed to an ongoing judicial struggle between the COM and one of represented administrations.

Apart from the specific subject, the scene as such allowed for an interesting impression. It seemed to me that the COM is sometimes regarded as a “black box” or a secretive sphere that provides uncertainty for actors. Because of this perception insider meetings are deemed valuable because actors hope to get an insight into the black box.

This black box-perception gives COM officials additional discourse steering capabilities. Those capabilities depend on the officials known poison in the black box as well as her perceived influence in the organisation, which in turn relate to the perception of the internal processes in the black box by actors. This is an indication of the importance of personal and informal contacts in the black box.

the nucleus of a European public ?

2005-12-12T23:25:00.000+01:00

Lobbying - that is people talking about specific, sometimes even very specific issues no one else cares about. Probably not quite. The issues are from (or meant for) the political sytem. Decision-makers are the counterparts of lobbyists - which means there are two. If those two are sharing information and exchanging opinions about issue X, the conversations should be interesting for other actors. At least two kinds are certain to be more or less interested: 1. stakeholders in X; and 2. journalists who want to know more about X.
Discourse between politicians and lobbyists about issue X might than be regarded as some kind of a very low key quasi-public discourse - at least inasmuch X finds its way onto the political agenda or the journalist understands X and writes about it.

Might lobbying in Brussels than be seen as a low intensity and thinly populated European public?

discursive policy making and expert circles – part II

2005-12-10T18:13:00.000+01:00

Talking to a long time representative in Brussels about the participation of experts in EU policy making, he voiced the observation that the COM aims to actively include sympathizing experts in public consultation processes and conferences. Citing an example from the field of municipal planning policy he said that experts had been briefed by the COM in Brussels before attending a conference on the subject as speakers/moderators.

special interests v. public good

2005-11-30T21:16:00.000+01:00

Representing particular interests to policy makers which are responsible for justifying their decisions eventually poses certain requirements. In an open policy environment where decision are made in - or at least acquainted to - the public an alignment with a certain special interest is nothing a policy maker can afford. That is as long as there is at least one competing special interest. This means that a special interest has to be nestled to the policy objective. Depending on the policy maker, a policy is more or less a solution for a societal problem which is a stumbling block on a society's pursuit of the public good. Therefore a special interest has to be nestled to the public good in order to increase its chances of being considered by a policy maker. But how to do that?

discursive policy making and expert circles

2005-11-02T17:07:00.000+01:00

In a recent conversation with a high-ranking COM official some interesting views on the COM as actor in the policy discourse came across:

Policy proposals are developed with all relevant actors in a particular field. The participation of experts in the process is necessary to create a common ground for the COM proposal, but the process itself also contributes to the implementation of a policy later in the policy process. Experts who are included in the early stages of the development eventually regard themselves as stakeholders of the proposal which they helped to create with their own ideas.

Lobbying is essentially a self reflecting system where lobbyists first sell their own problem perception with regard to a policy proposal to their customers in order to be able to offer solutions for those problems. A rule of thumb is: “a good lobbyist drafted the bill, a bad one fights it”.

If a proposal is published by the COM, it has the ability to emphasize according to national sensibilities different aspects of it in different MS. Since by that time, relevant experts are already familiar with the proposal, ensuing debates are among second order experts and can be used to judge the political room of manoeuvre with respect to sensible topics.

To develop a successful proposal, political steering is a condition sine qua non. It is therefore important to have political staff that brings in expertise from their MS. Necessary is a political impact assessment, prior to the decision to engage in a policy area. Political support from MS and stakeholders is a precondition for COM activities, if the circumstances change the poison of the COM changes accordingly.

lobbying the European Union

2005-10-15T00:04:00.000+02:00

I have been interested in lobbying and the European Union, since I first visited Brussels in 2001. Back then I was working on a comparison between regionalisation processes in different member states of the European Union (Italy, Spain, UK) in the course of a seminar. The seminar was taught by the head of the “Vertretung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen bei der Europäischen Union”, the regional representation office of my home state in Germany. During a visit in Brussels the instructor gave a talk about the political system of the EU and the importance of knowing the right people in Brussels. I remember being fascinated by both aspects, the institutional complexity of that political system and the importance of the human factor in such a multilingual environment.
Several years later, after I graduated, I found myself working in the “Landesvertretung” as an intern. As it turns out, all that glistens isn’t gold but the subject is even more fascinating…

http://www.europa.nrw.de/

starting point

2005-10-10T16:14:00.000+02:00

I finally decided to put some of my current thoughts out on the web. Why? Well, first of all there are many good reasons why scientists or practitioners in many fields are blogging these days. To list them here wouldn’t make a lot of sense, since you are reading my blog, which means you obviously have your own idea why people do it (or you will get one in the process).
However, the fact that you can read it on the web is only part of the story. The main motivation behind writing this blog is rather self-centred. It serves predominantly the purpose of recording thoughts/ideas/concepts which are not yet elaborated enough to be used otherwise - therewith minimizing the risk of being buried inside my head with limited chances of rediscovery. Also, comments on current developments and news will be put on record to capture the essence of flying days.

http://lobbyeu.blogspot.com/